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Telehealth and telecare research has been dominated by efﬁcacy trials. The ﬁeld lacks a sophisticated
theorisation of [a] what matters to older people with assisted living needs; [b] how illness affects
people’s capacity to use technologies; and [c] the materiality of assistive technologies. We sought to
develop a phenomenologically and socio-materially informed theoretical model of assistive technology
use. Forty people aged 60e98 (recruited via NHS, social care and third sector) were visited at home
several times in 2011e13. Using ethnographic methods, we built a detailed picture of participants’ lives,
illness experiences and use (or non-use) of technologies. Data were analysed phenomenologically,
drawing on the work of Heidegger, and contextualised using a structuration approach with reference to
Bourdieu’s notions of habitus and ﬁeld. We found that participants’ needs were diverse and unique. Each
had multiple, mutually reinforcing impairments (e.g. tremor and visual loss and stiff hands) that were
steadily worsening, culturally framed and bound up with the prospect of decline and death. They
managed these conditions subjectively and experientially, appropriating or adapting technologies so as
to enhance their capacity to sense and act on their world. Installed assistive technologies met few
participants’ needs; some devices had been abandoned and a few deliberately disabled. Successful
technology arrangements were often characterised by ‘bricolage’ (pragmatic customisation, combining
new with legacy devices) by the participant or someone who knew and cared about them. With few
exceptions, the current generation of so-called ‘assisted living technologies’ does not assist people to live
with illness. To overcome this irony, technology providers need to move beyond the goal of representing
technology users informationally (e.g. as biometric data) to providing ﬂexible components from which
individuals and their carers can ‘think with things’ to improve the situated, lived experience of multi-
morbidity. A radical revision of assistive technology design policy may be needed.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.Introduction
Assisted living technology research: new paradigm needed
High-proﬁle efﬁcacy trials of telehealth (which we deﬁne here
as remote medical monitoring and/or treatment of people in their
homes) and telecare (remote support services such as alarms orx: þ44 20 7882 2552.
nhalgh).
r Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.fall detectors) have allegedly demonstrated that such technical
interventions ‘work’ and been widely cited by policymakers who
are keen to implement them ‘at scale’ (Greenhalgh, Procter,
Wherton, Sugarhood, & Shaw, 2012). But such enthusiasm may
reﬂect pro-innovation bias and a misplaced modernist dream
(EFORTT Research Team, 2012; Greenhalgh et al., 2012). In reality,
the science of assisted living is still in its infancy.
In the early days of home computing, it was assumed that
computers would be used in the home for the same tasks as they
were used in the ofﬁce e ﬁling, calculating, aggregating and so on.
Early computers aimed at the home market emphasised how
important these tasks were (or were likely to become) in the
modern home. Some years later, people began to use home
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tionally undertaken in the home (playing games, playing music,
socialising) in a digitally enabled way. Only then did home
computing take off ‘at scale’ (Dourish & Bell, 2011).
Assisted living technologies may be in a parallel situation today.
Current solutions assume that self-management of illness at home
will occur in the same way as medical management occurs in
hospital e by generating, analysing and manipulating objective
measures of health status (e.g. biometric and behavioural data), so
that the ‘informationally represented’ patient can be monitored,
prompted and treated by remote health and social care providers.
An alternative approach to delivery of telehealth and telecaremight
be to analyse what traditionally happens in the home in relation to
living with chronic illness, and consider how these activities and
practices could be digitally enabled.
What matters to people
The technologisation of health and social care reﬂects the
growth of rationalist logic in late modernity. Rationality is distin-
guished by its formal and instrumental character, its abstraction
from concrete situations, and its focus on means (the efﬁciency of
doing a task) rather than ends (the ‘rightness’ of the task itself)
(Sayer, 2011). Sayer contrasts instrumental rationality with phro-
nesis (practical reason), characterised by its concern with the
concrete and the particular; its practical, embodied and tacit
character; its emphasis on ends rather than means (in particular,
whether the ends are desirable and ethically justiﬁed); and its focus
on human relationships and ‘what matters to people’.
The literature on telehealth and telecare, framed mostly in the
abstracted, rationalist language of gathering, transmitting and pro-
cessing data, has largely overlooked the fact that self-management
of illness is not solely a matter of information processing. Rather,
it involves practical and moral choices that take account of the
(personally meaningful and socio-culturally framed) particularities
of the situation. When we are seriously ill, we yearn for human
contact and for someone with symbolic power to witness our
suffering and take responsibility for decisions that may have grave
consequences (Schei, 2006). The empirical work described in this
paper was designed deliberately to decentre technologies and place
what matters to people at the centre of the research.
Illness and frailty in the lived body
The clinical literature on multi-morbidity tends to focus on the
objective (informationally represented) patient, emphasising such
things as the validity of metrics and scores for chronic disease
surveillance, and on decisions that stem from analysis of this in-
formation, rather than on the lived experience of these same con-
ditions (Huntley, Johnson, Purdy, Valderas, & Salisbury, 2012;
Marengoni et al., 2011). Such representations are sited within
particular cultural discourses linked to power-knowledge align-
ments (e.g. evidence-based medicine, pay-for-performance
schemes, self-management programmes) that reﬂect particular
professional and commercial interests (Pickard, 2012).
The ‘informational’ framing of ageing and disease resonates
with the wider research and policy discourse on self-management
of chronic conditions. The policy assumption is that through
structured education (e.g. ‘expert patient’), an individual can
develop the ability to (rationally) monitor and interpret the pa-
rameters of their disease and make healthy lifestyle choices,
thereby coping more effectively with their condition and prevent-
ing or deferring the onset of complications (Lorig & Holman, 2003).
The ﬂaw in such arguments is that they are predicated on a
mind-body dualism in which knowing one’s illness is equated withconverting one’s inner bodily states to a set of abstracted, rational
data items (such as blood sugar level or blood pressure). Hence,
knowing becomes ‘knowing about’ and ‘representing as informa-
tion’ rather than ‘experiencing’ (Pickard & Rogers, 2012). The in-
dividual is expected to follow standardised coping protocols to deal
with ﬂuctuations in measured variables. The role of the doctor or
nurse in such situations is assumed to be one of information pur-
veyor, providing key items of information needed for the individual
to make rational management choices.
Following Merleau-Ponty, Pickard and Rogers suggest that, in re-
ality, the ‘expert’ patient is characterised by a very different form of
knowinge the existential knowledge of the lived body. The challenge,
especially with multi-morbidity, is to integrate embodied self-
awareness with the practical work of living with chronic illness,
each individual becoming an expert in what works best for them
(Paterson, Russell, & Thorne, 2001). This work often involves navi-
gating a host of physical and cultural challenges within the family,
community and healthcare system. While experiential knowing has
not traditionally been seen as legitimate in clinical circles, there is
emerging evidence of its importance in self-management (Hinder &
Greenhalgh, 2012; Ruston, Smith, & Fernando, 2012).
Perceptions are shaped not only byour sensory capacities (which
may be variously impaired in states of illness) but also by the wider
socio-cultural frames into which we have been socialised (Merleau-
Ponty,1945/1962). Thus, for example, pain is both a real and physical
subjective sensation and shaped by cultural expectations of who
should feel pain, in what circumstances and how. A related theo-
retical approach to multi-morbidity draws on Bourdieu’s notion of
habitus (internalised schemas, dispositions and perceptions of the
social world) and ‘ﬁeld’ (the set of social relations in which we are
embedded, along with its associated norms, expected patterns of
behaviour, ﬁnancial and regulatory constraints and so on). Multi-
morbidity has been analysed in terms of a loss of Bourdieu’s
“physical capital” (as important as cultural and economic capital)
andas a “fracturingof thebodilyhabitus” (page6) (Townsend,2012).
Such phenomenological approaches are discussed further below.The materiality of technologies
The material features of technologies e dimensions, shape,
colour, durability, size of buttons, brightness of screen and so on e
have a powerful inﬂuence on whether and how technologies are
used. But ‘materiality’ also includes sociological implications of
these features (Dourish & Mazmaniam, 2011). Digital goods have
cultural meaning. Some (such as iPads) symbolise status, inde-
pendence, modernity and youth; others (such as alarms or incon-
tinence detectors) may symbolise precisely the opposite cultural
phenomena: decay, dependence, stigma and loss of youth. Digital
networks and connectivity can transform places and spaces: a
home is a very different (and a more or less comfortable,
welcoming and private) place when connected to broadband.
Materiality also includes sociological implications of informa-
tional metaphors and forms of representation. Doctors communi-
cate health status, for example, by transmitting information and
by representing patients in terms of biometric values, ‘risk scores’
or ‘pathways’, leaving experiential and symbolic aspects of health
and illness unrecognised and unexamined. Such framings shape
questions that can be asked about the patient and hence the
menu of possibilities from which ‘evidence based’ decisions are
selected. A further aspect of materiality comprises the material
conditions of technology production e the need, for example,
for particular arrangements of capital, labour and regulatory in-
frastructures to generate technologies and make them work
(Dourish & Mazmaniam, 2011).
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We aimed to develop a phenomenologically and socio-
materially informed theoretical model of assistive technology
adoption and use by older people. Our research questions were: [a]
what matters to older people with assisted living needs?; [b] how
does the experience of illness, especially multi-morbidity, affect
people’s capacity to use assistive technologies?; [c] how does the
materiality of assistive technologies inﬂuence their uptake and use
in the home?; and [d] what are the implications for technology co-
design and delivery of health and social care services?
Method
The ATHENE study
The ATHENE (Assistive Technologies for Healthy Living in El-
ders: Needs Assessment by Ethnography) project is funded by the
Technology Strategy Board under its Assisted Living Innovation
Platform programme (Sugarhood, Wherton, Hinder, Procter, &
Greenhalgh, in press; Wherton et al., 2012). Phase one of the
project, whose ﬁndings are described here, involved detailed
ethnography of 40 individual cases to map the complex healthcare,
social care and socio-cultural needs of older people and their carers
from a range of ethnic and social groups. Phase two, technology co-
design with industry and other partners, is ongoing and will be
reported separately. The project steering group includes repre-
sentation from industry, NHS, social care, end users, third sector
and academics.
Setting and sample
The study was undertaken in 2011e13 across two sites (in
London and Manchester) characterised by ethnic and socio-
economic diversity with a predominance of poverty and depriva-
tion. Characteristics of the participants are summarised in Table 1.
Theoretical framework
Drawing on the clinical experience of two team members (TG, a
general practitioner, and PS, an occupational therapist), we sought
to understand how experience of illness and ageing affected ac-
tivities of daily living and uptake and use of assistive technologies.Table 1
Summary of participants.
Age (median, range) 81 (60e98)
Gender
Male 13
Female 27
Ethnicity
White British 24
Other European 1
South Asian 4
Chinese 3
Caribbean 5
African 2
Housing status
Own house or ﬂat 19
Privately rented 1
Housing association 7
Local authority 10
Sheltered housing (i.e. with resident warden) 3
Living arrangements
Alone 18
With partner only 13
With partner and/or other relative 9Our starting-point was Sayer’s notion of what matters to people e
especially the personal histories, material settings and networks of
relationships within which people’s lives are lived and make sense.
To study the lived body, and following Pickard and Rogers
(2012), we used Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological lens. This
proposes that embodiment is the basis of (subjective) experience
and that bodily perception is the basis for practical action. Merleau-
Ponty (1962) proposed the centrality of a ‘body schema’ (a dynamic
ability to engage physically and cognitively with the world so as to
make acts possible: the body is ‘polarised by its tasks’ e page 115)
and ‘motor intentionality’ (a pre-reﬂective, intelligent bodily
awareness of self and environment). The body schema and motor
intentionality, along with more reﬂective forms of intentionality,
enable the person, to a greater or lesser extent when ill or impaired,
to place him- or herself within the world and ‘get a grip on it’.
Ageing and degenerative illness do not sit well with this focus
onwhat Heidegger called ‘potentiality’ (Heidegger, 1962). In Sayer’s
words, “A key characteristic of pain and suffering is that they are not
merely states of being, but of frustrated becoming, or continuous
yearning for relief and escape” (2011, page 42). As life nears its end,
the essence of well-being shifts from realising one’s possibilities to
confronting the inevitability of one’s own death (Sarvimaki, 2006).
Life-threatening illness has been depicted as a state of existential
liminality, lacking the potentiality that characterises the young and
healthy life (Little, Jordens, Paul, Montgomery, & Philipson, 1998).
An orientation to actively inﬂuencing the future aligns the three
Heideggerian concepts of ‘being-in-the-world’ (Dasein), ‘using’ and
‘making’. The thingswe use andmake (technologies) are not neutral
objects but embodiments of our selves and our cultural values. All
human activity is in some way technologically mediated. A familiar
technology is ‘ready-to-hand’, backgrounded and available to
mediate between the individual and the world when picked up and
used by the skilled human actor. But if the technology does not
‘work’ as intended, it loses its phenomenological transparency and
begins to interferewith the individual’s relationship to the world.
Technologies can thus be disabling as well as enabling, dis-
empowering as well as empowering e the more so when the
technology has potentially harmful features and/or the human
lacks skill (Brittain, Corner, Robinson, & Bond, 2010). Material fea-
tures are key, since they affect what the person is capable of
perceiving and doing with a technology in particular real-life sit-
uations. Phenomenology underpins the science of experience-
based design, which takes the patient’s ‘ordinary experience’ as
its starting point (Bate & Robert, 2007). Few technologies designed
for the so-called smart home are ‘plug and play’; there is an
emerging literature (considered further in the Discussion) on how
individuals adapt and customise them to ﬁt with personal needs
and capabilities and with the material constraints of their local
setting (Dourish & Bell, 2011).
A criticism of phenomenological analysis is that it fails sufﬁ-
ciently to acknowledge that subjective perceptions are shaped by,
and interact with, external structures (Bourdieu, 1977). To over-
come this limitation, while retaining the insights of Merleau-Ponty
and Heidegger recounted above, we drew on Stones’ strong struc-
turation theory (Stones, 2005), which we have also previously
adapted to incorporate a technology dimension (Greenhalgh &
Stones, 2010). Through this composite approach, we considered
the recursive relation between the physical and social constitution
of individuals, the external social structures they inhabit, and the
‘active agency’ through which they confront and negotiate their
external social context.
Of these three elements, the ﬁrst, the physical and social
constitution of our participants e akin to Bourdieu’s habitus, but
with greater reference to emotions and what they cared about e
was marked both by body schemas that were in decline, and by
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many years. The second element, the external social structures they
inhabited e akin to Bourdieu’s notion of ﬁelds e incorporates a
material, technological dimension alongside and interweavingwith
the social. The third element, their routine relationship to the
question of ‘how to go on’ in that social milieu, given their current
health conditions, had typically been actively renegotiated (part
reﬂexively and part tacitly). The extent to which assistive tech-
nologies were taken on board or rejected depended on the unique
combination of: the nature of the decline in their physical capac-
ities; their sense of what coping strategies would be seemly or
‘appropriate’ socially, and not too frightening, risky or against their
deeper values; how they weighed doing the right thing socially
against their own personal wants, frustrations, and ﬁnancial re-
sources; their ability, both emotionally and cognitively, to suc-
cessfully incorporate new demands into their everyday routines;
and whether or not they received necessary support in making any
of the above adaptations they felt able to contemplate.
Data sources
Data were collected by JW, PS and SH, all of whom had many
years’ experience working with people with assisted living needs.
Each participant was considered as a ‘case’ and visited on up to
ﬁve occasions (usually three) for periods of ethnography lasting
1e4 h. After obtaining written informed consent, we sought to
build up a rich picture of the case using a range of data sources as
described in detail elsewhere (Wherton et al., 2012). These
comprised:
Interviews: Participants were invited to talk about their life (past
and present), home, assisted living needs and hopes for the future.
A semi-structured prompt (available from authors) was used to
begin the conversation but used adaptively if the participant chose
to deviate from it. We sought stories about real situations in which
assistive technologies were used or not. All interviews, which lasted
20e90 min, were recorded and transcribed in full.
Cultural probe: Participants were given a collection of artefacts
including a digital camera and a ‘home and life scrapbook’ that
prompted them to record ideas, wishes, pictorial representations
of their body and social world, and accounts of how they spent
their day. They were assured that they could complete as much or
as little of the scrapbook as they wished and were offered printed
copies of the photographs they took as a thank-you for partici-
pating. At a subsequent visit, the researchers and participant
reviewed the materials collected and discussed themes of
interest.
Home tour: Participants led the researchers on a tour of their
home, pointing out things that were signiﬁcant to them.
Field notes: The researchers made free-text ﬁeld notes during
and immediately after every visit. These notes focused particularly
on incidents and events that occurred during the visits, and
included examples of the use of assistive technologies, issues of
concern to participants, and encounters with friends, carers or
relatives.
Throughout the ﬁeldwork, the index participant chose which
other individuals (e.g. carers) to invite to participate in the study,
and how each of them would be involved e e.g. by taking photo-
graphs of them, writing about them in the scrapbook, asking them
to be there when the researcher visited or seeking their input in
real time when being interviewed themselves. Two participants
with moderate dementia were unable to give full informed con-
sent; with ethics committee approval, we built their case study
mainly via their primary carer. Apart from these, we did not recruit
any carers or professional staff directly, but many featured in the
case studies indirectly.Data management and analysis
Each case dataset consisted of multiple, multi-modal data
sources including spoken and written stories, photographs, draw-
ings, diagrams and ﬁeld notes. The researcher who had led on the
ﬁeld visit (JW, PS or SH) ﬁrst studied all these materials in depth so
as to gain familiarity with them, and drew together an outline
summary of the case using Powerpoint to organise selected quo-
tations and pictures. Following a presentation to other team
members, this researcher produced a longer, illustrated interim
case narrative with identifying details ﬁctionalised. In a second
(analytic) stage undertaken by TG (a clinician with a social science
background), each case was summarised in a standard format,
including a theoretical analysis guided by ﬁve questions informed
by strong structuration theory as we had previously applied it to
technology uptake and use (Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010):
1. What is the social, cultural and historical context in which this
participant is experiencing ageing and chronic illness?
2. What is their experience of illness, ageing and (if appropriate)
decline and impending death? In particular, what can we say
about their existence in the world and their body schema and
motor intentionality?
3. What matters to this participant? What are their key re-
lationships and who or what do they care most about?
4. What are the key technologies in their home and life? To what
extent, and in what way, are these technologies materially
‘ready-to-hand’ (hence enabling and empowering)? If they are
‘not working’, why?
5. What happens in particular, real-life situations when the
participant contemplates (or might be expected to contem-
plate) the use of an assistive technology e and what are the
consequences of this for them and the people they care about?
In such situations, how do they draw on their culturally shaped
dispositions and body schemas (‘habitus’) and on the materi-
ality of available technologies to achieve what matters to
them? If they choose not to use an assistive technology, how is
this explained with reference to habitus and materiality?
All participants were offered the opportunity to review their
case summary and comment on our interpretation; many made
minor (mostly factual) adjustments but no participant rejected our
interpretation or emphasis. The ﬁnal analysis across all 40 case
studies used the constant comparative method (adding successive
cases to an emerging picture of the full sample) to produce an over-
arching summary and theorisation of themes and issues (Strauss &
Corbin, 1990).
Main ﬁndings
Description of dataset
Our sample consisted of a socially and ethnically diverse group
of older people aged 60e98, with a wide range of medical condi-
tions, housing and social circumstances (Table 1). Numerous as-
sistive technologies such as alarms (28 cases), environmental
sensors (8 cases) specialised telecare devices such as falls detectors
(three cases), and telehealth monitors (8 cases); standard tech-
nologies (e.g. phones, televisions); and conventional assistive de-
vices (e.g. rails, hoists) were installed. The raw dataset consisted of
ﬁeld notes, transcribed narrative and semi-structured interviews
(on all participants), completed or part-completed ‘home and life
scrapbooks’ including lists, maps and diagrams (on 20 partici-
pants), and hundreds of photographs (taken by 15 participants
and by researchers with participants’ consent). Interim analysis
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Phenomenological analysis of these summaries revealed a number
of themes that we present below.
We have deliberately used lay terminology and, where possible,
participants’ own words, to describe their various conditions and
how these inﬂuenced the lived body. Differences across cases were
explained mainly by the nature of participants’ subjective impair-
ments and the resources available to them e both material (e.g.
money, broadband) and social (e.g. relatives nearby). Commonal-
ities across ethnic groups were far more striking than differences.
The lived experience of multi-morbidity and ageing
Table 2 lists participants’ formal (‘objective’) medical diagnoses
and experienced (subjective) impairments. Almost all had multiple
chronic conditions whose effect on their ability to sense and act on
their world was complex and mutually reinforcing. Many partici-
pants consented for their case summaries to be published; these
are available online at www.atheneproject.org.
Pierre has high blood pressure, dizziness, a stomach ulcer, an eye
condition that gives him blurred vision (for which he is under a
specialist eye clinic), pain and stiffness in the shoulders and knees,
and urinary incontinence following an operation on his prostate
gland. . He moves slowly and is in evident pain. He stops
frequently to lean on furniture and when he tries to make the
researcher a cup of tea he becomes so tired he is unable to ﬁnish the
task. Pierre’s sleep quality is severely disrupted by his continence
problems and shoulder pain. He wakes up about 6 times during the
night and has to use a bucket at the side of the bed. For this reason,
his wife sleeps in a separate room. He has little energy in the
mornings due to poor sleep, and attributes much of his dizziness to
his sleep disturbance.
From case summary of Pierre, African, age 73Table 2
Summary of medical conditions and subjective impairments.
Objective medical conditions
Neurological conditions (stroke, Parkinson’s, other tremor,
severe migraine, past polio, not formally diagnosed)
20
Arthritis 14
High blood pressure and/or high cholesterol 14
Chronic respiratory disease (COPD, asthma) 13
Diabetes 11
Macular degeneration, glaucoma or cataract 11
Coronary heart disease 10
Depression, anxiety or psychological stress 7
Dementia, cognitive or memory problems 7
Side effects from medication 7
Trauma (e.g. recent or persisting effect of past fracture) 6
Swollen feet without formal diagnosis 3
Cancer 2
Other (e.g. urogenital, kidney failure, anaemia, tendency to
infections, hormone deﬁciency, peptic ulcer, sleep apnoea,
deafness, Paget’s disease, osteoporosis)
16
Subjective impairments affecting basic day to day tasks
Generalised tiredness/low energy 23
Signiﬁcant and persistent pain 18
Stiffness or weakness in joints and/or muscles 18
Shortness of breath 13
Poor or no vision 11
Unsteadiness, dizziness or balance problems 9
Poor cognitive capacity, concentration or conﬁdence 11
One or more limbs paralysed 7
Bulky device affecting mobility (oxygen cylinder, catheter) 7
Incontinence 6
Difﬁculty with ﬁne ﬁnger movements and/or writing 5
Blackouts, loss of consciousness or perceived risk of these 5
Physical bulk (obesity, severely swollen legs) 4
Wandering 2As this case extract and the data in Table 2 illustrate, the com-
monest and often most disabling impairments were non-speciﬁc
(e.g. tiredness, slowness, poor concentration).
Nine of our 40 participants had conditions that were (hypo-
thetically) amenable to telehealth monitoring, such as blood pres-
sure following stroke or blood oxygen levels in people with lung
disease. Of these nine, only three were using their telehealth
technologies regularly and as intended. Bonnie, for example (White
British age 81: anxiety, heart disease and lung disease), described
her telehealth kit as a “Godsend”. This appeared to be because
Bonnie’s daughter visited her daily and was skilled in the use of the
equipment; she was also on ﬁrst-name terms with the woman in
themonitoring centre towhom she reported Bonnie’s readings. The
reasons for non-use of telehealth in the other six participants were
instructive. In contrast, Rhoda (white British, age 77: chronic heart
and chest disease, anxiety, diabetes) found the equipment un-
comfortable and difﬁcult to use. Thennan (South Asian, age 74:
diabetes, high blood pressure and leg pains) was unable to under-
stand the automated messages sent in response to his biometric
data. Walter (White British age 72, chronic lung disease and in-
continence) had a full set of telehealth equipment installed but had
abandoned using it because the couple with whom he lived were
not free to send the readings to the monitoring centre at the
required time (before 10 am every day). Elizabeth (White British
age 74: chronic lung disease) said, “I just couldn’t be bothered with it.
It just got on my nerves every morning.” In contrast to Bonnie, she felt
that her relationship to the monitoring centre staff was distant and
impersonal and that she had never had any useful feedback on the
readings submitted.
Many informal carers in this study were past retirement age and
in poor health themselves. One participant in her 90s had recently
nursed her son through cancer treatment; another looked after an
adult son with learning difﬁculties and challenging behaviour. On
one of our home visits, a younger relative of the participant, who
had moved in to care for her after a stroke, lost consciousness from
a (known) cardiac problem.
What matters to older people with assisted living needs?
Almost universally, our participants identiﬁed relationships,
especially with family members and old friends, as what mattered
to them most. Bereavements (of spouse or friends) had left some
with a deep sense of loss andmanymore feared the anticipated loss
of a loved one. All 15 who were born outside UK made great efforts
to keep in contact with relatives abroad even when they had
immigrated decades before.
While some participants appeared to like their own company,
many were both socially isolated (i.e. their limited social network
was objectively demonstrable) and extremely lonely (i.e. they
subjectively perceived a lack of social contact or companionship and
were troubled by this). Most sought not to trouble their children or
other relatives because (as more than one of them explained)
“they’ve got their own lives to lead”. One had cut herself off from
family entirely so as not to be a burden.
All participants gained fulﬁlment e currently or in the past e
from doing things and making things. Their historical accounts of
their lives revealed a wide range of past occupations, family or
community roles, hobbies, cultural and/or religious afﬁliations, and
moral or political causes that were important to them. Many
described the work they had put into raising their children, looking
after family or community members, and maintaining and
improving their home and garden over the years. Some could still
pursue the activities fromwhich they gained fulﬁlment, but only in
a compromised way. They particularly valued doing things that
symbolised independence e for example, growing and cooking
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physically very difﬁcult (“[It’s] pride: I don’t want to put on anybody
else as long as I can do it myself” e Betty, white British, age 86: se-
vere arthritis).
Most participants yearned to get out in order to do things
(explore a familiar physical world, go shopping, pursue hobbies,
attend church, visit friends), though only some achieved this. A
consistent theme in our datawas boundedness (Little et al., 1998)e
a participant’s sense that their physical and social worlds were
shrinking inexorably as they became more impaired (and also as
their friends became similarly impaired or died).
Some participants appeared to have adapted reasonably well to
the restricted menu of largely passive activities on offer to them
(e.g. watching television), and were sanguine about their shrinking
horizons (“You could go funny if you worried about it too much,
couldn’t you?” e Eda, white British, age 91: stroke, arthritis and
visual impairment). Others showed considerable determination to
overcome boundedness, and gained a great sense of fulﬁlment
when they managed to do so. Such achievements depended to
some extent on ﬁnancial resources (the better-off took taxis when
they could no longer manage on public transport, for example),
access to information and social networks.
Many participants were prepared to take risks in order to ach-
ieve what mattered to them. This attitude often contrasted with
that of their relatives and health and social care professionals,
whose priority was often to maximise safety. But participants also
felt extremely vulnerable and were anxious about being forgotten
or abandoned by both relatives and professional carers (“I’m scared
of them [doctors] closing a drawer and forgetting me” eMolly, white
British, age 77: blindness and arthritis).
Many participants were frequent attenders at their general
practitioner or the Accident and Emergency department. While
Pierre (see extract above) has a stand-alone blood pressuremonitor
and takes daily readings, for example, he sees his GP fortnightly for
a check-up because this reassures him and he feels that the doctor’s
surgery is the ‘right’ place for his blood pressure to be taken.Materiality and capability
In this section, we consider the material features of technologies
alongside the physical and cognitive capabilities of their intended
users. One or two participants showed us, or spoke about, greatly
valued technologies (most commonly, walking aids) that were
‘ready-to-hand’ in the Heideggerian sense. For example, Vera (white
British, age 85: stroke, recent fracture, tremor) recounted the story
of a favourite shopping trolley that she had lost on a coach trip:
“[The shopping trolley] was my lifeline, it was my Rolls Royce. This
got me out and gave me fun, it gave me conﬁdence, this thing, it
was great. It was manoeuvrable, it was stable, it was just
marvellous. It is important, top of the list, it’s the most important
thing to me because that gets me out, it gets me going on trains,
buses, and not a nuisance to people. [.] Sometimes it’s just the
lucky one that you get, and my lucky one was taken.”
Interview with Vera
Some participants spoke positively about their assistive tech-
nology devices. Some who were prone to falls valued their pendant
alarms because they had an abstracted, hypothetical sense of the
beneﬁts that these technologies might bring in an emergency.
Others saw no value in the technology if they had never needed to
use it (“I ain’t fall down to that where I can’t try to get up, like I knock
myself out or anything, no” e Jasmine, Caribbean, age 71: heart
disease, diabetes, stroke and recurrent falls, in response to a
question on why she refuses to wear a falls detector).Not a single participant depicted assistive technologies as ready-
to-hand in the same way that Vera spoke about her lost shopping
trolley. Indeed, several described (and some demonstrated) the
material challenges associated with efforts to keep assistive tech-
nologies on their person and/or in active use. For example, one
deeply religious participant’s pendant alarm got caught in the
cruciﬁx she hadworn since childhood, though in this case shemade
the matter-of-fact decision to stop wearing the cruciﬁx. Some as-
sistive technologies actively interfered with people’s day-to-day
activities, made their homes (they felt) look untidy or cluttered,
or became activated inadvertently. It was common, for example, for
people to tie pull cords out of theway, and one participant’s son had
taped a jam-jar lid over an emergency alarm button in her hallway
“to stop it going off” (Nadine, African, age 90: recent severe stroke).
Three participants (visually impaired, cognitively impaired, termi-
nally ill) had lost their pendant alarms.
Many of the assistive technologies in this study (e.g. blood
pressure monitoring, falls detectors, alarms) had been supplied
after an acute event (e.g. stroke, fall). They served, at best, to pro-
vide objective information (biometic data, emergency alerts) to
health and/or social care providers. But they did not improve the
lived experience of impairment. Indeed, they were not designed to
do soe but therein may lie one explanation for their limited uptake
and use.
Another material explanation for low use of assistive technol-
ogies was that some participants viewed them as belonging in a
hospital and as bringing them one step closer to institutional care
or death. For example, Rhoda (details above) is not at all reassured
by the telehealth equipment in her bedroom and is keen to hide it
from view:
“It worries me looking at it. My bedroom’s such a tip with it. My
grandson, he’s maintenance. He’s going to do something at the back
of my bed so I can put machines down there. Save me looking at
them all day.”
Interview with Rhoda
Many participants searched proactively for technologies that
would compensate for speciﬁc physical impairments. Vera (details
above), for example, had found weighted cutlery to compensate for
her hand tremor and identiﬁed some kitchen gadgets featured on a
television programme. Bilal (South Asian, age 70: paralysed after
stroke) learnt to use an iPad when he could no longer write.
However, the options for compensating for non-speciﬁc impair-
ments such as chronic tiredness and poor concentrationweremuch
more limited.
Another dimension of materiality was the presence and
affordability of wireless access. Ella (Caribbean, age 94: neurolog-
ical condition, weak bladder, arthritis) had previously used her
laptop to keep in touch with relatives in USA by Skype and email.
But when she was rehoused from an old council block to a new
bungalow, the free wireless she had enjoyed was no longer avail-
able. As she commented, “I can’t afford the Internet”.Real incidents of using or choosing not to use assistive technologies
Participants’ use of an assistive technology was inﬂuenced by a
number of factors. Most obviously, they needed to be aware that the
technology existed and believe it to be ‘working’. Many had a hazy
understanding of their assistive technologies, and we found one
fully installed and functioning alarm system (with pendant) of
which the intended user (Nina, white British age 61: diabetes,
obesity, leg pains) claimed to be unaware.
At the time the device needed to be used, participants’ physical
and cognitive capability had to align with its material properties
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(diabetic hypoglycaemic attack) in which she was unable to coor-
dinate pressing the alarm, though another participant used an
identical device successfully in the early stages of a similar attack.
Another inﬂuence on use was whether participants had been
sufﬁciently organised and alert to have the device on their person
at the crucial moment. Tellingly, Vera described her pendant alarm
as “marvellous” and said she would “never be without it”, yet be-
tween two of the visits for this study she had a fall and was not
wearing her alarm.
The most powerful inﬂuence on whether participants used an
assistive technology in a real incident was what they envisaged
would happen if they did use it. Some perceived their pendant
alarm, for example, as connecting them to a wider, benign social
world, effectively bringing professional carers into the home, and
imagined (correctly) that the ﬁrst stage in the encounter was a
simple conversation through the remote device.
“It’s marvellous.. you never feel with them that you’re an idiot.
you feel safe, the way they speak to you”
Mrs K, white British age 80: poor vision, paralysed leg, bad chest
Others viewed the same pendant alarm as potentially exposing
them to sinister intrusion or surveillance by unwanted strangers, or
as threatening to precipitate dramatic scenarios that were embar-
rassing (e.g. ambulance arriving when they were not dressed), so-
cially disruptive (e.g. disturbing their children at work) or
personally threatening (e.g. leading to unwanted hospital admis-
sion). When such perceptions were held, the device was rarely, if
ever, activated.Bricolage and the role of bricoleur
Successful technology arrangements were often characterised
by bricolage e pragmatic customisation in which new devices or
components were adapted and/or combined with legacy ones
already in the home (Longo, 2009, pp. 134e147). While this was
rarely seen with assistive technologies, it was common for partic-
ipants, or someone who knew and cared about them, to ‘ﬁddle’
with other technologies (e.g. computers, kitchen equipment) to
adapt the home environment to their (often changing) needs:
Bilal has recently had a landline phone and broadband connection
installed. Two of his nephews work in IT; they organised the
connection, set up a Gmail account, taught Bilal how to use his
iPad, laptop and Skype, and are available to ﬁx any problems. His
iPad was purchased by a friend and given to him while he was on
the stroke unit. He has hundreds of apps on it and appears to use
them competently; many are games or for drawing, and he also has
exercise video apps for his arms and legs.
From case summary of Bilal, details above
Essential requirements for the bricoleur role appeared to
include a detailed understanding of participants’ needs and wishes,
an ability to match these needs to technologies that were already
available in the home or obtainable and affordable outside it, some
technical ability and a willingness and capacity to revisit the home
setting to adjust the technology when needed. Technical aspects of
the role were typically undertaken by a younger, male relative.
Female relatives typically helped participants choose off-the-shelf
technologies (e.g. by taking them shopping or doing this
with them online). Some participants conﬁded that their well-
meaning children had bought, installed, adapted or thrown away
technologies without fully understanding their needs or ascer-
taining their wishes, resulting in what Heidegger would call‘unreadiness-to-hand’ (i.e. a phenomenological mismatch between
materiality and capability).
While most bricolage was done by relatives, some participants
were linked to social services ‘care and repair’ staff who undertook
adaptations, though this remit explicitly excluded buying new
components or repairing computers. Mrs K (details above) had two
paid “helpers”, one of whom had taken on a semi-formal bricoleur
role, namely suggesting new technologies, purchasing these on her
behalf, customising them (especially by linking them with existing
technologies in the home) and mobilising input from technical ex-
perts when needed. Interestingly, Mrs K was adamant that such a
role was only possible because she had rejected the standard ‘home
help’ package and paid privately for helpers who would do the jobs
shewanted (rather than those set out in a service level agreement).
Some cases were characterised by absence of anyone to take on
the bricoleur role. This was true of two couples (one white British
and one Chinese) where both partners had severe and deteriorating
chronic illnesses; neither was technically competent or conﬁdent;
they had no children or other relatives in the UK; they had few
friends as they had preferred to keep each other company over the
years; and they had poor understanding of how to access help. All
four had unmet assisted living needs, some of which could have
been met through basic adaptations but which had not been
identiﬁed or addressed.
Dourish and Bell (2011) have described a ‘liminal zone’ in which
technologies stay for a greater or lesser period of time after being
purchased but before becoming fully up and running, and to which
they are consigned when no longer used but before being thrown
away. Homes with an adept bricoleur tended to be characterised by
virtual absence of this liminal zone and vice versa. Geraldine (white
British, age 98: severe dementia) and her live-in son Eddy had two
rooms that were so full of discarded materials and unopened pur-
chases that they were uninhabitable.
Eddy used to have a baby monitor which provided some reassur-
ance if Geraldine tried to get up at night or became distressed, but
this broke and has not been replaced. The (non-functioning) re-
ceivers and speaker still sit in Geraldine’s room. He thinks a similar
device (perhaps with video) would make a big difference to their
lives. Perhaps it could be ﬁxed so his face could appear on Ger-
aldine’s TV screen. [.] Eddy bought a laptop ﬁve months ago and
has plans to set it up so that Geraldine can view old photos (which
he plans to scan in). He saw a documentary once that said old
people with dementia get a lot out of looking at old photos. How-
ever, this task has taken low priority and the laptop is currently still
in the box.
From case summary of Geraldine
In most cases, bricolage was a negotiated accomplishment,
dependent on the strength of the participantebricoleur relation-
ship. It drew on the bricoleur’s embodied and intuitive under-
standing of the person’s needs, coupled with his or her competence
and time available to perform the work.Discussion
This study, analysed from a phenomenological perspective, has
shown that the illness experiences and assisted living needs of
older people are diverse and unique, hence do not lend themselves
to simple or standardised technological solutions. Participants
managed their health conditions subjectively and experientially,
appropriating or adapting technologies so as to enhance their ca-
pacity to sense and act on their world e a task that became ever
more challenging and complex as multi-morbidity took its toll and
the older person’s physical and social world steadily shrank.
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exceptions, the formal range of ‘assisted living technologies’ did not
assist the study participants to live with illness in any direct sense,
though when embedded in a wider socio-technical network they
sometimes did so indirectly. Conventional assistive devices, home
adaptations, telephones andpersonal computers appeared to bemore
directlyusefulande in somecasesat leaste achievedwhatHeidegger
would call phenomenological transparency, thereby materially
empowering the person to achieve the things that mattered to them.
Our ﬁndings highlight the distinction between the ‘objective’
patient represented on the typical telehealth monitor and virtual
ward (consisting of test results, biometric data and so on) and the
subjective and culturally framed sensations and motor intention-
ality of the lived body. We believe this distinction has profound
implications for assistive technology design, especially in relation
to telehealth and the goal of self-management of multi-morbidity.
In particular, the Heideggerian concept of readiness-to-hand is of
marginal relevance to an objective framing of technology use but
central to a subjective framing of such use. Few, if any, of our par-
ticipants sought an abstracted, informational knowledge of their
various medical conditions, nor did they equate living with illness
to making decisions based on such knowledge. Rather, their
expertise was in the unique capabilities and limitations of their
own body and mind, and the experiential knowledge of what
worked for them (Paterson et al., 2001).
The term ‘bricolage’ was originally introduced by the anthro-
pologist Levi-Strauss to refer to making do with tools that are
available to address an immediate, local and contingent problem or
need. Kirmayer emphasised that the bricoleur, who “thinks with
things to create an order based on the logic of the concrete”, is applying
knowledge that is practical andopportunistic rather than theoretical
and abstracted (page 170) (Kirmayer, 1993). In the context of tech-
nological artefacts, bricolage emphasises crafting solutions using
whatever is at hand, “the rapid assembly and conﬁguration of ‘bits and
pieces’ of software andhardware” (Hartswood, Procter, Rounceﬁeld, &
Sharpe, 2000, page2) andweargue that this approachoffers a partial
solution to the issues exposed by our study.
Bricolage emphasises blending new and second-hand materials
to produce one-off devices and adaptations for one-off problems
(Büscher, Gill, Mogensen, & Shapiro, 2001; Hartswood et al., 2000).
While this might produce affordable and ﬁt-for-purpose solutions
at the individual level, and may be particularly suited to those with
idiosyncratic needs and/or limited ﬁnancial resources, it is a far cry
from the focus of current UK policy and funding streams, which are
oriented to producing a ﬁnite menu of technology solutions and
implementing these “at scale” via business models that place high
value on the commercial viability of particular stand-alone prod-
ucts (Technology Strategy Board, 2010). Indeed, the political econ-
omy implications of a bricolage approach to assistive technology
design are profound:
“an environment supporting bricolage is not supposed to provide
users with sophisticated (i.e. semantically rich) modelling tools that
facilitate the top-down construction of the application (from the
conception of the ‘entities’ involved, their attributes, their mutual
relationships, and of the ‘business processes’ where all these latter
interact); but rather this logic is supposed to offer to the users a set
of ‘bricks’ that they can arrange and compose together in a bottom-
up fashion within a conceptually consistent environment (the rules
of composition).”
Cabitza & Simone, 2012, page 35
While we offer no solutions to the political barriers to change
implied in this extract, the design challenge to support a
phenomenological approach to self-management in the home e byproducing “bricks” and developing and supporting bricolage by
users and carers e could form the basis of a signiﬁcant and radical
revision of the research agenda in assistive living.
A research agenda on bricolage for assisted livingmust address a
number of additional issues. Firstly, although bricolage might be
understood as a pragmatic response to the failures of conventional
design, are there ways in which conventional design can support
bricolage? If technologies are to have the compositional properties
implied above, they must adhere to standards that will facilitate
substitutability and interoperability. As yet, however, suppliers
show few signs of making progress towards common standards e
and it is arguably not in their commercial interests to do so. A short-
term solutionwould be for suppliers to design in more adaptability
into their products, thus enabling bricoleurs to customise them.
One line of enquiry should be to explore the extent to which
examples of successful bricolage-affording technologies might be
repurposed for assistive technologies. Selection and installing of
discrete packages of functionality (‘apps’) is now routine for users
of mobile devices such as smart phones and tablets. This suggests
that technical prerequisites for bricolage include widely adopted
platforms (not tied to mobile devices per se, but available on do-
mestic devices such as TVs) that deﬁne how components interact
and are ‘open’ to encourage diversity in component provision.
Bricolage comes about not through one-off clever designs, but
through a fundamental reconﬁguration of the mode of technology
supply.
Secondly, there is the problem of dependability: how can we
assure reliability of technologies subject to the manipulations of
bricoleurs, when people’s well-being (and lives) may depend on
them? Given the lack of support for bricolage in evidence among
the assistive technologies in our study, it is unsurprising that some
participants simply disabled or ‘lost’ them. But providing more
opportunities for adapting and customisingmay increase the risk of
failure. Multiple adaptation options, in particular, may generate
complex interactions and thereby increase the risk of unintended
consequences.
Thirdly, who are the bricoleurs of assistive technologies and
what does it take to be one? What kinds of skills, what degree of
familiarity with the user and context are important, and how can
these be mapped onto the available human resources? Assistive
technologies are components of collaborative networks, tying pa-
tients, technology suppliers, family and informal carers and health
and care service providers together. Bricolage must therefore be
understood and supported as a collaborative activity. A signiﬁcant
area of research should address how to achieve this.
In conclusion, our ﬁndings resonate strongly with those of the
EFORTT research team, whose qualitative study of telecare across
four European countries conduced: “telecare does not offer a
‘technological ﬁx’ to replace either traditional health care services
or informal care networks: it is not an easy solution to demographic
ageing, ‘care crises’, personnel crises, or budget crises in ageing
societies. Telecare does not perform care on its own.” (EFORTT
Research Team, 2012, page 3). Our own study, which covered tel-
ehealth as well as telecare and used ethnography as well as in-
terviews to capture participants’ experiences directly, has produced
ﬁndings that strengthen and extend those of the EFORTT study. We
suggest that further ethnographic and narrative research on
bricolage and bricoleurs may illuminate how the practice of caring
for someone with assisted living needs is (or could be) ‘performed’
with the aid of technologies.
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